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I. INTRODUCTION 
As we celebrate the 100th anniversary of Nineteenth Amendment, I 
write this paper to explore the influence of the Nineteenth Amendment on 
U.S. military occupation policy in Post-World War II Japan. A mere 25 
years after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, the Nineteenth 
Amendment had become so ingrained in U.S. identity that the first 
demand of General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied 
* Cornelia Weiss is a retired military colonel, having served in the Americas, Europe, and the Pacific. 
Honors received include the US Air Force Keenan Award for making the most notable contribution 
to the development of international law and medals from Colombia for human rights and military 
justice accomplishments. She holds a BA in Women’s Studies from the University of Utah, an MA 
from Chile’s national academy of strategy and policy studies, and a JD from Vanderbilt University 
School of Law. Knowing that history is often used as an excuse to exclude women, she excavates 
forgotten history about women, peace, and power. 
1
Weiss: Going Beyond Suffrage
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
388 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:387 
Powers (SCAP) to Japan, was the “emancipation of women through their 
enfranchisement.”1 However, unlike the U.S., “enfranchisement” under 
the U.S. headed occupation (Occupation) did not stop at suffrage. Instead, 
enfranchisement under the Occupation incorporated the definitions of 
“enfranchise” (“to endow with the rights of citizenship” and “to free, as 
from bondage”2) to create legal reforms to actualize the “emancipation of 
women” (women’s emancipation policy). The Committee on the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW Committee), in paragraph 13 of its General 
Recommendation 30, recognizes: “Women’s rights in . . . post-conflict 
processes are affected by various actors, including States.”3 This paper 
focuses on the impact of an outside power—with its own contradictory 
history of suppression and agitation for women’s rights—to influence 
whether discrimination against women is eliminated, decreased, 
continued, or increased. 
I start this paper by examining the orders the Occupation was 
expected to fulfill and the belief that to fulfill its orders, the Occupation 
needed to seek the “emancipation of women.” I review the Occupation’s 
patriarchy analysis. I address women’s suffrage. I examine the 
Occupation’s proactive efforts to eradicate the “enslavement” of women 
(enslavement through bondage and licensed prostitution). I explore the 
Occupation’s drafting of a constitution that included not only women’s 
suffrage, but that went beyond the U.S. Constitution to provide rights of 
“dignity and essential equality” for women (yet omitted social guarantees 
for women). I unravel two disparate election laws enacted under the 
Occupation and address their differing effect on women’s ability to vote 
and to be elected, as well as the Occupation’s efforts to counter 
psychological violence against female candidates and to provide equal 
opportunity for female candidates. I then turn to the Civil Code drafted 
under the Occupation to examine its implementation (and failures of 
implementation) of constitutionally mandated rights of “dignity and 
essential equality” for women. I address the Labor Law drafted under the 
Occupation and its effect on women’s economic (in)equality. I conclude 
1. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 294 (1964). As Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers (SCAP), General MacArthur was the head of the “Occupation” in post-WWII Japan. 
An “occupation,” as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary, is “the military government 
controlling an occupied nation or territory.” Occupation, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1997).  
2. Enfranchise, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY.
3. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation
No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict, and Post-Conflict Situations, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/GC/30 (2013). 
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by addressing the future through the lens of the 200th anniversary of the 
Nineteenth Amendment. 
I do not address in this paper the criticisms directed against the 
women’s emancipation policy, be they at the time of the Occupation 
(“experts” expressing the view that “Japanese women were too steeped in 
the tradition of subservience to their husbands to act with any degree of 
political independence”4) or today’s implied charges of “imperial 
feminism.” I further do not speculate whether, “but for” the Occupation, 
women in Post-World War II Japan would have obtained suffrage, the 
elimination of “enslavement,” and equal rights in their constitution. 
However, in an interview in 1964, women’s rights pioneer Ichikawa Fusae 
opined that without (1) the defeat of Japan and (2) the Occupation, 
Japanese women would not have gained constitutional rights as quickly.5 
I write this paper as a veteran of years of U.S. military service as a 
military lawyer (JAG), culminating in the rank of colonel. Now retired, 
my opinions are my own. My education, from women’s studies to war 
college, excluded any mention of General MacArthur’s “women’s 
emancipation policy.” My experiences, to include military service in 
FARC-era Colombia (where, had the government of Colombia not 
discriminated against women, Colombia arguably would not have 
suffered war to the extent it did6), have led me to question why the history 
of the Post-WWII “women’s emancipation policy” in Japan is unknown 
and untaught in military, peace, legal, history, and gender studies. The 
absence of this history has impoverished our ability, as stated by a former 
U.S. president and Nobel Peace Prize winner, to grapple with “the most 
serious, pervasive, and ignored violation of basic human rights”—
discrimination and violence against women and girls.7 I write to 
illuminate our ability to address discrimination and violence against 
women and girls. 
4. MACARTHUR, supra note 1, at 305. 
5. Dee Ann Vavich, The Japanese Woman’s Movement: Ichikawa Fusae, a Pioneer in
Woman’s Suffrage, in WOMEN AND WOMEN’S ISSUES IN POST WORLD WAR II JAPAN 54 (Edward R. 
Beauchamp ed., 1998). 
6. Cornelia Weiss, Transforming Reality: Employing International Law to End Practices that 
Exclude Women as Peacemakers, Peacekeepers, and Peacebuilders, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INT’L LAW AND PEACE 329–50, at 333 (Cecilia Bailliet ed., 2019). 
7. Front inside jacket cover to JIMMY CARTER, A CALL TO ACTION: WOMEN, RELIGION, 
VIOLENCE, AND POWER (2014) (regarding discrimination and violence against women and girls). 
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II. ORDERS
In late August 1945, the night before flying from Bataan to Japan to 
start the Occupation (before the formal surrender ceremony of September 
2, 1945, on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay), General MacArthur, on his 
front porch, “outlined his policy in Japan”; a policy that explicitly 
included “allow women to vote.”8 
A little over a month later, on October 3, 1945, General MacArthur 
“expressed” to Japan’s Prime Minister: “In the achievement of the 
Potsdam Declaration, the traditional social order under which the 
Japanese people for centuries have been subjugated will be corrected.”9 
General MacArthur continued: “In the implementation of these 
requirements and to accomplish the purposes thereby intended, I expect 
you to institute the following reforms in the social order of Japan as 
rapidly as they can be assimilated.”10 MacArthur’s first demand: “The 
emancipation of the women of Japan through their enfranchisement—
that, being members of the body politic, they may bring to Japan a new 
concept of government directly subservient to the well being of the 
home.”11 
One potential effect: By January 1, 1946, Emperor Hirohito issued 
an Imperial Rescript requiring “government by members of all classes of 
people, equality of opportunity, and equity and justice to be the yardstick 
of action instead of tradition.”12 
To understand why a sexagenarian male military leader (General 
MacArthur 1880–1964) demanded the emancipation of women, we must 
first understand that military members seek to fulfill the lawful orders they 
are given. The orders to the Occupation of Post-WWII Japan required the 
Occupation, in addition to eliminating militarism, to promote democracy. 
8. Bonner Fellers, Notebook of General Bonner Fellers, handwritten notes of Aug. 29, 1945, 
MacArthur Memorial Archives.  
9. Press Release [on meeting between Prime Minister Baron Shidehara and General
MacArthur], at 1 (Oct. 3, 1945) (MacArthur Memorial Archives) [hereinafter Meeting between Prime 
Minister Shidehara and General MacArthur]. 
10. Id. See also MACARTHUR, supra note 1, at 294.
11. Id. See also MACARTHUR, supra note 1, at 294; General Headquarters, Supreme 
Commander for The Allied Powers, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 
514, Political Series: 119, Item 3, Present Day Government Politics - Tokyo Shimbun - 24 Dec 45. 
Translator S. Ono, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/
Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/political-0514-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/66P6-
3BHV] (“According to Supreme Headquarters’ directive, issued shortly after its formation, the current 
Cabinet was ordered to accomplish the following . . . (1) liberation of the Japanese women through 
women’s suffrage.”) 
12. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN, POLICY AND PROGRESS 23, App. 26 (U.S.
Gov. Print. Off. 1946) [hereinafter POLICY AND PROGRESS]. 
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(In addressing whether a military could impose democracy, General 
MacArthur stated: “Pure democracy is inherently a spiritual quality which 
voluntarily must spring from the determined will of the people. It thus, if 
it is to become firmly rooted, may not be imposed upon a people by force, 
trickery or coercion.”13) 
Two instruments comprised the orders: (1) the July 26, 1945 
Potsdam Declaration and (2) the September 21, 1945 U.S. Initial Post-
Surrender Policy (Policy). 
The Potsdam Declaration demanded: “The Japanese Government 
shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic 
tendencies among the Japanese people . . . respect for the fundamental 
human rights shall be established.”14 
The Policy laid out the ultimate objectives for the Occupation stating 
that “the ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, to 
which policies in the initial period must conform are”: 
(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United 
States or to the peace and security of the world. 
(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and 
responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and 
will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States 
desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to 
principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility 
of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not 
supported by the freely expressed will of the people.15 
To achieve the ultimate objectives, the Policy required, in addition to 
disarming and demilitarizing Japan,16 that the Occupation “encourage” 
the Japanese people “to develop a desire for individual liberties and 
respect for fundamental human rights”17 and “to form democratic and 
representative organizations.”18 The Policy charged the Occupation to 
“reform” and “progressively influence” the legal system “to protect 
13. Memo signed by Gen. MacArthur, Alfred Rodman Hussey Papers, at 17-A-2-1 (Apr. 23,
1946), available on microfiche at the U.S. Library of Congress [hereinafter HUSSEY PAPERS]. 
14. Potsdam Declaration, para 10 (1945). 
15. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Politico-Military Problems. in the Far East:
United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan, SWNCC 150/4/A, at Part I (B) (Sept. 21, 
1945), http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/022_2/022_2tx.html [https://perma.cc/9XCN-
B4SY]. 
16. Id. at Part I.
17. Id. at Part I (C).
18. Id. 
5
Weiss: Going Beyond Suffrage
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
392 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:387 
individual liberties and civil rights.”19 The Policy mandated: “Laws, 
decrees and regulations which establish discriminations on grounds of 
race, nationality, creed or political opinion shall be abrogated; those which 
conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be 
repealed, suspended or amended as required.”20 
What the Policy did not mandate was abrogating, repealing, 
suspending, or amending laws, decrees, and regulations that established 
discrimination on grounds of sex and gender. Nor did the military 
regulation of FM 27-5, the United States Army and Navy Manual of 
Military Government and Civil Affairs (Manual).21 Instead, the Manual, 
in addressing discriminatory laws, stated: “Laws which discriminate on 
the basis of race, color, creed or political opinions should be annulled as 
the situation permits. However, the practice of such customs or 
observance of such traditions as do not outrage civilized concepts may be 
permitted.”22 Whether and to what extent the Occupation would view 
discrimination against women as permissible or as an “outrage” is best 
viewed through the Occupation’s actions and inactions. 
III. PATRIARCHY ANALYSIS
Occupationaire Carmen Johnson, a Women’s Affair Officer from 
1947 to 1951 in the Shikoku Military Government Region and a member 
of the Women’s Army Corps during WWII, asked, “What – if anything – 
was to be done about”: 
• subordination of the individual;
• the traditional concept that women are inferior to men;
• hierarchy that put people into positions as inferior, equal or
superior in comparison with others;
• filial piety that taught duty and obedience to parents and
ancestors, and for wives, to mothers-in-law in particular, the
family system;
• the complex categories into which fell in or obligations; and
decision-making.23
19. Id. at Part III (3).
20. Id. 
21. FM 27-5, U.S. ARMY AND NAVY MANUAL OF MIL. GOV’T AND CIVIL AFF. (Dec. 22, 1943). 
22. Id. at 12, para 9(n). 
23. Carmen Johnson, Women’s Rightful Equality: An Objective of Shikoku Military
Government Region, in OCCUPATION OF JAPAN: THE GRASS ROOTS; THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
EIGHTH SYMPOSIUM 11, 16 (Walter F. Nimmo ed., 7–8 Nov. 1991). 
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Translated into everyday life, this included being “handicapped by an 
education inferior to that of men; limited by social pressures to modest 
behavior; paid inadequate salaries less than to men; ill-equipped or 
lacking in administrative training and experience; circumscribed by 
culture and tradition reaching back thousands of years.”24 Over a half-
century after the Occupation, the UN Security Council, in UNSCR 1325, 
advocated for post-conflict “measures that ensure the protection and 
respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to 
the constitution, the electoral system, the police, and the judiciary.”25 
Whether the Occupation of Post-World War II Japan in 1945, not the 
Swedish government in 2014, had the world’s first “feminist foreign 
policy,” I leave for others to re-evaluate. 
For the first years of the Occupation, SCAP issued monthly reports 
on the Occupation. These SCAP reports reflected the Occupation’s 
understanding of Japan as well as provided insight into what SCAP found 
to be important. Important included women. SCAP reports had a section 
titled “Women.” 
The first SCAP report, the report of September–October 1945 (the 
beginning of the Occupation), addressed the Occupation’s understanding 
of the historical status of women in Japan, stating: “From time 
immemorial the great mass of Japanese women has been restricted both 
by custom and legislation from any form of activity which would make 
them appear as equal of men.”26 At least one member of the Occupation 
contended: “There is no reason to believe that the cake of custom is so 
hard that it cannot be broken.”27 Whether the Occupation could, and 
would, break the restrictions by legislation would remain to be seen. 
The report of September–October 1945 asserted that the Occupation 
had taken the steps of compiling “a list of laws restricting the rights of 
women”; giving “nationally known women leaders” the opportunity to 
appear on the radio; and advising officers of women’s organizations “on 
methods of organization.”28 Barbara Molony maintains that “soon after 
MacArthur arrived in Japan, Kato Ishimoto Shidzue was summoned to the 
Occupation Headquarters to advise the Americans about policies on 
24. Id. 
25. S.C. Res. 1325, para 8(c) (Oct. 31, 2000). 
26. SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
SUMMATION OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN AND KOREA, SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1945 at 
169–70 para. 100 [hereinafter SUMMATION SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1945]. 
27. W. I. Ladejinsky, Trial Balance in Japan, 27 FOREIGN AFF. 104, 116 (1948).
28. SUMMATION SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1945, supra note 26, at para 103. 
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women and family reform.”29 Helen Hopper explains that, in the first 
month of the Occupation (September 1945), the Occupation asked 
Shidzue what Japanese women wanted.30 Hopper then reports that 
Shidzue replied “broadly that they would want to see their rights as human 
beings assured.”31 Molony also maintains “as early as 1945,” 
Occupationaire Lieutenant Ethel Weed “had called together a number of 
leading feminists, including Kato, Ichikawa Fusae, Miyamoto Yuriko, and 
Yamakawa Kikue.”32 Lieutenant Weed was the Women’s Information 
Officer in the Women’s Affair Branch of the Civil Information and 
Education Section (CIE) of General MacArthur’s Headquarters.33 Her 
job: “To formulate policy in areas affecting Japanese women and to 
develop ‘programs for the dissemination of information pertinent to the 
reorientation and democratization of Japanese women in political, 
economic and social fields.’”34 
By December 1945, the SCAP report stated: “Women are beginning 
to discuss the feudalistic family system and the need for removal of legal 
discrimination against them.”35 The Occupation recognized the 
relationship between Japan’s “house” system and the emancipation of 
women. (It is unclear the detail of knowledge of the “house” system that 
General MacArthur had when he stated that the emancipation of women 
was to bring to Japan a “government directly subservient to the well being 
of the home.”36) The “house” system was a system in which immediate 
and extended family members, regardless of whether they lived together 
or not, pledged unconditional allegiance to the “head of house” in 
exchange for protection and financial support37: 
• The “head” had “absolute authority over family members.”38
29. Barbara Molony, Introduction to BARONESS SHIDZUÉ ISHIMOTO, FACING TWO WAYS: THE 
STORY OF MY LIFE, at xiv (1984). 
30. HELEN HOPPER, A NEW WOMAN OF JAPAN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF KATŌ SHIDZUÉ
158 (1995). 
31. Id.
32. Barbara Molony, Afterword to BARONESS SHIDZUÉ ISHIMOTO, FACING TWO WAYS: THE 
STORY OF MY LIFE, at xxv (1984). 
33. HOPPER, supra note 30, at 161. 
34. Id. 
35. SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
SUMMATION OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN AND KOREA, DECEMBER 1945 at 174, para 30 
[hereinafter SUMMATION DECEMBER 1945]. 
36. MACARTHUR, supra note 1, at 294; Meeting between Prime Minister Shidehara and
General MacArthur, supra note 9. 
37. NAOKO TAKEMARU, WOMEN IN THE LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY OF JAPAN: THE LINGUISTIC 
ROOTS OF BIAS 27 (2010).  
38. Id. 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss2/4
2019] GOING BEYOND SUFFRAGE 395 
• The “head” owned the “family property” (with the
concurrent duty to “support needy members” of the house,
as long as they were members of the house).39
• If a family member did not submit to the “head,” the “head”
had the power to expel the non-submitting member from the
house.40
• The duty of support extinguished as soon as an individual
was no longer a member of the house—be it by divorce,
death, or expulsion—with dire results, to include
homelessness and starvation.41
The Civil Code of 1898 may have created the “house” system for all of 
Japan.42 Alfred Oppler, the Occupationaire in charge of the Legal Affairs 
Section during the drafting of the Civil Code, acknowledged: “Closely 
connected with this hierarchal set-up was the inferior role of women in 
Japanese society.”43 
It appears during the Occupation, belief existed in the need to 
eradicate patriarchy: 
• “SCAP seeks to eradicate a patriarchal system which has
served to stifle liberalism and democracy, locally and
nationally.”44 (Occupationaire W.I. Ladejinsky)
• “[T]he failure to achieve true democracy in Japan can be
traced to this old feudalistic family system. Democracy will
never become a reality, under a family system in which the
rights and freedom of every member are not fully
recognized.”45 (Sunday Mainchi Magazine)
• “It is hardly necessary to say that the family is the unit and
basis of all social relations. Unless it is democratized . . . one
39. Alfred C. Oppler, The Reform of Japan’s Legal and Judicial System under Allied
Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B.J. 290, 318 (1949). 
40. Id. at 317. 
41. Id. at 317–18. 
42. TAKEMARU, supra note 37, at 27. 
43. Oppler, supra note 39, at 317. 
44. William M. Gilmartin & W. I. Ladejinsky, The Promise of Agrarian Reform in Japan, 26
FOREIGN AFF. 312, 319 (1948). 
45. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 1395, Political Series: 349, Item 1, The General Election 
by ABE, Shinnosuke - Magazine: Sunday Mainichi (Weekly) - 20 Jan 46 Issue. Translator: T/E 
Ikemura & Sugasona, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/
Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/political-1395-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/RXU4-
DJQN]. 
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can never hope for the democratization of any social 
relationships, whatsoever, be it the educational system, labor 
relations, economics or government.”46 (Japanese Legal 
Scholar Sakae Wagatsuma)47 
IV. SUFFRAGE
Women’s suffrage, and demand for women’s suffrage, existed in 
Japan before the Occupation. Marnie Anderson and Nancy Diggs Brown 
contend that, in 1880, some Japanese women did hold the right to vote at 
the local level, and others fought for women’s suffrage.48 Sally Ann 
Hastings, writing about the suffrage movement in Japan, states: “Even 
before the order from SCAP arrived, the Shidehara cabinet had already 
approved a decision to enfranchise women.”49 Hastings asserts that, on 
August 25, 1945, “Ichikawa Fusae, Yamataka Shigeri, and other women 
leaders of the pre-war suffrage movement formed a Women’s Committee 
on Postwar Policy.”50 According to Dee Ann Vavich, in the last days of 
August 1945, after “a very cool reception” from the Prime Minister, 
Ichikawa Fusae appealed to the newly forming Liberal party and returned 
with a promise that it would include women’s suffrage in its platform.51 
Hastings further asserts that at a meeting on September 24, 1945, 
“members of the Women’s Committee passed a resolution addressed to 
the political parties demanding voting rights and political equality before 
the law.”52 According to Helen Hopper, during the September 1945 
meeting at the Occupation Headquarters with Shidzue about women’s 
rights, the Occupationaires “expressed astonishment over the extent to 
which Japanese women had already made democratic demands and the 
fact that these women were not ‘in the dark’ about civil rights.”53 
46. Sakae Wagatsuma, Democratization of the Family Relation in Japan, 25 WASH. L. REV. & 
ST. B.J. 405, 426 (1950). 
47. Japan May Need a Sakae Wagatsuma-like Scholar to Help Hold Abe to Account, 
MAINCHI (Jun. 29, 2019), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170629/p2a/00m/0na/008000c 
[https://perma.cc/X4FC-FH3L]. 
48. MARNIE ANDERSON, PLACE IN PUBLIC: WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN MEIJI JAPAN 28, 32 (2010);
NANCY DIGGS BROWN, STEEL BUTTERFLIES: JAPANESE WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
98–99 (1998). 
49. Sally Ann Hastings, Women’s Professional Expertise and Women’s Suffrage in Japan,
1868-1952, in GENDER, NATION AND STATE IN MODERN JAPAN 191 (Andrea Germer, Vera Mackie 
& Ulrike Wöhr eds., 2014).  
50. Id. 
51. Vavich, supra note 5, at 53. 
52. Hastings, supra note 49, at 191.
53. HOPPER, supra note 30, at 158. 
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While General MacArthur issued his expectation on October 3, 1945, 
for women not to be denied suffrage, it was not until November 26, 1945, 
that the Diet convened for 18 days, principally to address the passage of a 
bill revising the law for the election of members to the House of 
Representatives54 (the Ministry of Home Affairs “Bill for Revision of 
Law for the Election of the Members of the House of Representatives”).55 
However, as late as November 30, 1945, at least one [male] member of 
the House of Peers asked: “I understand that the Women’s Suffrage Law 
is ordered by the Supreme Commander, and if so, the Diet cannot 
disapprove of it on the ground it is premature?”56 One of his fellow [male] 
Peers responded: “The Women’s Suffrage Law is not demanded formally 
by the Supreme Commander, but is only a wish expressed by him. The 
Government, with the point of view that it would be right for the 
Government itself to bring about such a desired matter, has proposed the 
bill.”57 The proposed bill became the Election Law of December 17, 1945, 
which, inter alia, introduced a new voting system and no longer excluded 
women’s suffrage.58 
Within days after ending the exclusion against women, women’s 
political power increased. By December 29, 1945, a newspaper reported 
a push for a women’s cabinet to govern Japan, with the author stating: 
“There are many women who are amply qualified for cabinet members.”59 
The article addressed how, when a family becomes bankrupt, that “it is 
not rare in Japan that . . . the master retires to be replaced by the mistress, 
who, by virtue of her efforts, restores the family to its former 
prosperity.”60 After providing ten names of women qualified to be cabinet 
members, the author questioned, given that Japanese men were no longer 
subject to military conscription due to Japan’s loss of the war, whether it 
54. SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
SUMMATION OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN AND KOREA, NOVEMBER 1945 at para 10.  
55. Id. at 26. 
56. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 204, Political Series: 50, Item 5, Deliberative Right of 
the Diet and the Allied Forces - Asahi Shimbun - 1 Dec 45. Translator T. Okamura, DARTMOUTH C. 
LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/political-
0204-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/UA4T-7N4H]. 
57. Id. 
58. SUMMATION DECEMBER 1945, supra note 35, at 4. 
59. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 572, Pol. Series: 132, Item 5 Possibility of a Women’s 
Cabinet - Tokyo Shimbun - 29 Dec 45. Translator: T. Kitayama, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., 
https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/political-0572-
diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/P5SW-P455]. 
60. Id. 
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was “unreasonable to think the loss of responsibility means the loss of 
governing power?”61 The article’s author contended: “Unfortunately I 
have not heard of one instance in which men apologized to women, 
expressing their sorrow for having caused them great hardships.”62 The 
author further opined: “Men should reflect on their own failure . . . and 
should retire from leadership. They should help organize a women’s 
cabinet and endeavour to co-operate with women.”63 
The question raged whether women were prepared to vote. In 
December 1945, the SCAP report stated: “The Progressive and Liberal 
Parties contend that the majority of women are not yet prepared to use the 
ballot and they predict a light vote. The Socialist and Communist Parties 
have taken a more encouraging view and have inaugurated extensive 
educational programs.”64 
The announcement of women’s suffrage changed the political 
landscape. Most of the major Japanese political parties had female 
candidates.65 The Japan Women’s Party formed “the first such political 
organization in Japan’s history.”66 Two thousand women attended “[a] 
rally of all women’s organizations . . . in Tokyo [where] [a]ll political 
parties explained their platforms.”67 These platforms called for the 
“emancipation and equality of women.”68 
On January 12, 1946, SCAP directed the Japanese government, via 
SCAPIN 584, to hold its first general elections no earlier than March 15, 
1946.69 The election was then “postponed” from March 31, 1946, to April 
10, 1946, “to give the reorganized Japanese Home Ministry more time to 
‘screen’ prospective candidates [running for office—candidates who may 
have been ineligible for various reasons under purge rules].”70 As early as 
December 1945, the SCAP report opined that “[p]ostponement of the 
election will give women more time to develop their plans.”71 Thus a 
reason for the postponement might have also been to provide a greater 
opportunity for women to run for office, to empower women to vote, and 
for women to be elected. Historian Mary Beard recommended, in a 13-
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. SUMMATION DECEMBER 1945, supra note 35, at 176, para 46. 
65. POLICY AND PROGRESS, supra note 12, at 22. 
66. Id. 
67. Encouragement of Women’s and Youth’s Organizations, in SUMMATION DECEMBER 1945, 
supra note 35, at 176, para 43. 
68. POLICY AND PROGRESS, supra note 12, at 22. 
69. Id. at App. 27. 
70. Id. at 20. 
71. SUMMATION DECEMBER 1945, supra note 35, at 176, para 46. 
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page letter to Lieutenant Ethel Weed, to work with Japanese women to 
engage in actions such as “door to door canvas[ing],” “mass meetings with 
stirring speakers,” “use of press,” “polling people on streets,” and “street 
corner meetings.”72 
The election occurred “only seven months and seven days after the 
surrender.”73 General Whitney, the head of SCAP’s Government Section, 
observed: “There was wide criticism in Allied capitals of MacArthur’s 
decision to hold a general election so soon. But these critics obviously did 
not realize that most of the legislators with whom MacArthur would have 
to deal had been practically hand-picked at the height of . . . powers in 
1942.”74 And thus, “[t]he earliest possible date for a general election was 
therefore all-important.”75 
A concern was whether women would be able to have time to vote.76 
The war had devastated Japan. Jesse Steiner noted, in addition to “the 
scarcity of food and the widespread lack of employment,” that 
“[e]xtensive areas of the large cities were in ruins, many people still lived 
in air raid shelters, railway stations, and makeshift houses lacking even 
the elementary facilities for family life.”77 In addition to time constraints 
due to lack of food, employment, and housing; other issues also were 
feared to prevent women from voting. One writer to a Japanese newspaper 
stated: “The woman who is busy with the everyday affairs of life, despite 
the fact that she is interested in the election, will be inclined to abstain 
from voting because of the distance of the polling place or the complicated 
formalities of voting.”78 The writer’s proposed solution: “To prevent this, 
I want to advocate a new measure. That is, a voting box, which is locked 
like a money savings box, [which] would be taken from house to house 
by a member of the Neighborhood Association and every woman could 
72. Letter from Mary Beard to Lt. Ethel B Weed, pg. 3 (Sept. 30, 1946) (Smith College Special 
Collections).  
73. COURTNEY WHITNEY, MACARTHUR: HIS RENDEZVOUS WITH HISTORY 243 (1956). 
74. Id. at 244. 
75. Id.
76. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 1123, Political Series: 276, Item 3, The Importance of the 
Coming: General Election - Mainichi Shimbun - 3 Feb 46. Translator: K. Murakami, DARTMOUTH 
C. LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/Press_Translations_Japanese/
diplomatic/political-1123-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/S76K-JRXU]. 
77. Jesse F. Steiner, Japan’s Post-War Population Problems, 31 SOC. F. 245, 247 (1953). 
78. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 808, Pol. Series: 196, Item 2, A Woman’s Voice on 
Enabling Women to Vote - Provincial Newspaper Shinano Mainichi Shimbun (Nagano) - 14 Jan 46. 
Translator: S. Sano, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/
Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/political-0808-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/WD6C-
XFH8]. 
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put her vote into the box.”79 It does not appear that Japan instituted the 
idea. 
Female candidates came from all backgrounds and ideologies. A 
sampling of candidates and their platforms included: 
• Nishimoro Moto, a principal of the Makibi Girls’ High
School, who contended: “Female education is vital in order
to improve women’s status . . . I think it is owing to
American women’s fairness that measures for improving
Japanese women’s status after defeat has been taken by the
United States.”80
• Miyai Asaka, a leader of the Kagawa Local Committee of
the Communist Party with prior employment as a maid, who
advocated: “The extreme corruption of Japan is due to the
existence of capitalists and landowners, who are sabotaging
production. In order to establish the liberty of a new Japan,
it is urgent to solve our problems rapidly by promoting labor
unions, and overthrowing the local agricultural
administration.”81
• Tsuchiya Naraye, an official on the regular staff of the Osaka
Boys’ Court and the Osaka Local Court, who opined: “Since
we have been given suffrage, it is the only way to solve our
problem and to discharge our duty, isn’t it? It is time for
Japanese women to test their capacity by entering current
politics. I will try to use women’s power to maintain
peace.”82
The platforms of women candidates included: “connect[ing] daily life 
directly with policies”; “birth control”; “making rural women free”; 
“doing away with the system and tradition whereby women are treated 
only as trifles”; “stamp[ing] out tuberculosis”; “better conditions for 
women teachers”; “improv[ing] the deplorable conditions of Japanese 
wives and mothers”; “improvements in women’s education, the raising of 
79. Id. 
80. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 479, Pol. Series: 112, Item 1, A Series of Biographies of 
Female Candidates - Provincial Newspaper Shinane Mainichi (Nagano) - 19 Dec 45. Translator: N. 
Tachibana, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/
Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/political-0479-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/DF8C-
L4GY] [hereinafter Press Translations, No. 479]. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
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the standard of culture and assistance for families of deceased soldiers”; 
and “appeal[ing] on behalf of women’s difficulties in daily life.”83 
Between the time that the suffrage bill passed and the first election 
in which women voted, two other changes occurred—the abolition of 
lawful enslavement of women and the drafting of the Constitution. 
V. ENSLAVEMENT 
In January 1946, General MacArthur, via directive SCAPIN 642, 
“Abolition of Licensed Prostitution in Japan,” directed “the Japanese 
Government to abrogate all laws or ordinances permitting licensed 
prostitution and nullify all contracts that have the object of committing 
women to prostitution”;84 that is, the “annulment of laws which permitted 
the enslavement for legal prostitution of thousands of Japanese women.”85 
La Cerda, a U.S. journalist, reported that General MacArthur “acted . . . 
under that part of the Potsdam Declaration guaranteeing respect for 
fundamental rights.”86 Oppler explained that “licensed prostitution, with 
its Japanese by-product of involuntary servitude by women who bound 
themselves to serve for a fixed period, was abolished as inconsistent with 
the principle of equality of the sexes and individual liberty and dignity.”87 
Such enslavement, as described by the February 18, 1946, SCAP press 
release, was the “‘sale’ of daughters, frequently against the girls’ 
wishes.”88 Licensed prostitution was considered “a relic of a feudalistic 
system of slavery, unsuitable for a new democratic Japan.”89 It was 
anticipated that “more than 10,000 licensed prostitutes throughout the 
country will be set free.”90 
83. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 866, Pol. Series: 210, Item 4, The Whole World is 
Watching the Women’s Suffrage in JAPAN - Mainichi Shimbun - 20 Jan 46. Translator: R. Ochiai, 
DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/Press_Translations_Japanese/
diplomatic/political-0866-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/Q3T5-JBVT]. 
84. SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, CATALOG OF 
SCAP DIRECTIVES Vol 1, 90 (1952) [hereinafter SCAP DIRECTIVES CATALOG]. 
85. Press Release, Gen. Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Ending of Legalized Prostitution to 
be Commemorated, (Feb. 18, 1946) (MacArthur Memorial Archives) [hereinafter Ending of 
Legalized Prostitution Commemorated]. 
86. JOHN LA CERDA, CONQUEROR COMES TO TEA: JAPAN UNDER MACARTHUR 61 (1946). 
87. Oppler, supra note 39, at 296. 
88. Ending of Legalized Prostitution Commemorated, supra note 85. 
89. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 1177 Soc. Series: 233, Item 4 Abolition of Licensed 
Prostitution - Yomiuri Hochi - 6 Feb 46. Translator; T. Ogawa, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., 
https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/social-1177-
diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/X7SZ-SRGV] [hereinafter Press Translations, No. 1177]. 
90. Id. 
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The Women’s Christian Temperance Union (W.C.T.U.) of Japan had 
been working to abolish the practice of selling women and girls into 
prostitution since 1886.91 Mrs. Shimada Kiyo, Chief of the Women’s 
Department of the Labor Union, in addressing licensed prostitution, 
opined: “I think the existing fact, that the men are treating the women as 
mere playthings by having licensed quarters as social establishments 
proves that they should naturally be abolished without the directive of 
MacArthur’s Headquarters.”92 
In Japan, according to one Japanese lawyer, “licensed 
prostitution . . . was a prime source of revenue for local governments.”93 
One Japanese newspaper stated: “The existence of [licensed prostitution] 
houses supported by the Government and protected by the police . . . is 
the reason . . . for the slave-like position of Japanese women.”94 (The 
newspaper further opined that licensed prostitution “seems degrading to 
the Americans.”95 Licensed prostitution exists today in the U.S. Nevada 
law states, “It is unlawful for any person to engage in prostitution . . . 
except in a licensed house of prostitution”).96 
While licensed prostitution enriched the government, involuntary 
servitude, be it in or outside of prostitution, appeared to enrich fathers. 
Occupation lawyer, Justin Williams Sr., recounts being informed that 
“sometimes a young girl was sold to a ‘guardian’ but that it was more 
common for her to become security for a loan made to her father.”97 Mrs. 
Shimada Kiyo, Chief of the Women’s Department of the Labor Union, 
asked: “Are the women guilty? They are not, I dare say. Did women 
willingly enter into such a life? They fell into the miserable situation on 
account of this system which was created by men.”98 The Chief of the 
Women’s Department of the Labor Union urged: “[W]e must call for 
grave reflection by the families which want to make a living at the price 
of their dear daughters and to reed out such evils committed by the 
91. Ending of Legalized Prostitution Commemorated, supra note 85.
92. Press Translations, No. 1177, supra note 89. 
93. JUSTIN WILLIAMS, SR., JAPAN’S POLITICAL REVOLUTION UNDER MACARTHUR: A 
PARTICIPANT’S ACCOUNT 10 (1979). 
94. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 706, Soc. Series: 189, Item 1, The American Army 
Officers Attitude Toward Women by R. MASUMAN - Provincial Paper Hyuga Nichi-Nichi Shimbun 
(MIYAZAKI-SHI) - 4 Jan 46. Translator: H. Nishihara, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., 
https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/social-0706-
diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/8V8L-BYNZ]. 
95. Id. 
96. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.354 (2019). 
97. WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 10. 
98. Press Translations, No. 1177, supra note 89. 
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woman’s weakness to sacrifice herself.”99 A result of the end of 
involuntary servitude would be, as journalist La Cerda maintained, that 
“[n]o longer need the girls spend their lifetimes trying to repay that 
debt.”100 
One by-product of the end of selling girls and women into slavery, 
according to Occupation lawyer Oppler, was the rise of the 1948 Habeas 
Corpus Act.101 Oppler contended: “In a country where involuntary 
servitude of women and children had been almost customary, the need for 
protection from physical restraint was undeniable.”102 Occupationaire 
Williams observed: “When a girl saw fit to rebel against what some 
regarded as a form of slavery, the court always held in her favor.” 
However, for an individual held in bondage to be able to access the courts 
would have required the ability to access the courts. As Williams 
acknowledged, “Such cases were rare.”103 
The next question was what was next for freed women. Miss 
Yamamuro Tamiko, the Director of the Welfare Bureau of the Japan 
Christian Brotherhood, addressed the need to “establish . . . a women’s 
home, where these girls can rest their exhausted bodies and souls as a 
shelter until they start a new life, an inquiry office for giving these girls a 
chance to find a decent job, and an organization to give them vocational 
guidance.”104 Mrs. Shimada Kiyo, Chief of the Women’s Department of 
the Labor Union, urged: “We women want eagerly to emancipate these 
pitiful girls into a free world as soon as possible. We must give a warm 
welcome to those girls who have regained their freedom, give them a 
decent job, and lead then into a home-life upon their recovery from both 
mental and physical exhaustion or give them a stabilized livelihood.”105 
To ensure employment of “freed” former licensed prostitutes, the Labor 
Division of one prefectural government recommended transforming 
99. Gen. Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 1071, Soc. Series: 216, ITEM 1 Abolition of Licensed 
Prostitution – Provincial Newspaper Hokkoku Mainichi (Kanazawa) – 28 Jan 46. Translator: T. 
Ogawa, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/
Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/social-1071-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/ANW7-
C2L9]. 
100.  LA CERDA, supra note 86, at 61. 
 101.  Oppler, supra note 39, at 319–20 n.91 (1949) (citing Habeas Corpus Act, Law No. 199 of 
1948 (Japan)). 
102.  Id. at 319–20. 
103.  WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 10. 
104.  Press Translations, No. 1177, supra note 89, at 2–3. 
105.  Id.  
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brothels into hotels, with hotel jobs.106 In contrast, the Metropolitan Police 
maintained that “so long as the present social situation remains 
unimproved,” licensed prostitution would simply convert itself into 
private prostitution.107 Miss Yamamuro Tamiko, the Director of the 
Welfare Bureau of the Japan Christian Brotherhood, opined: “As for the 
problems of private prostitutes it depends more on the self-respect of men 
than on that of women.”108 
The Metropolitan Police planned to address the conversion through 
“limit[ing] the place of business for these private prostitutes to 5 
districts . . . so as to put them under control.”109 The Director of the 
Welfare Bureau of the Japan Christian Brotherhood decried that the “men 
who transmit the diseases from woman to woman are not the objects of 
control.”110 That is, police did not “control” men who were guilty of 
“spreading of venereal diseases.”111 Police used the power to “control” 
women through charges of prostitution to harass, shame, and detain 
women. The U.S. military police (with Japanese police) would arrest 
women on the pretense of being “streetwalkers” (prostitutes), take them 
to police stations, and then test them for VD (venereal disease). 
Christopher Aldous and Akihito Suzuki provide an example of “650–750 
innocent girls and women subjected to the humiliation of being displayed 
to the public as prostitutes, while being taken to the police station in the 
MP open jeep” and “further humiliated by being subjected to an exam for 
VD.”112 These women-harassing police sweeps went so far as to detain a 
female Diet member.113 
The outlawing of selling women and girls into prostitution did not 
make prostitution itself illegal. Japan did not make prostitution illegal 
until 1956, five years after the end of the Occupation. A film, Kenji 
Mizoguchi’s Street of Shame (“the heartbreaking tale of a brothel full of 
women whose dreams are constantly shattered by their socioeconomic 
 106.  General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 1419, Social Series, Item 2, Abolition of Licensed 
Prostitution in MIYAZAKI – Provincial Newspaper Hyuga Nichi-Nichi Shimbun (MIYAZAKI-SHI) – 
12 Feb 1946, Translator: S. Sakata, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/
Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/social-1419-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/6H3C-
NS2E]. 
107.  Press Translations, No. 1177, supra note 89, at 2. 
108.  Id. at 3.  
109.  Id. at 2. 
110.  Id. at 3. 
111.  Id. 
112.  CHRISTOPHER ALDOUS & AKIHITO SUZUKI, REFORMING PUBLIC HEALTH IN OCCUPIED 
JAPAN, 1945-52: ALIEN PRESCRIPTIONS? 156 (2012). 
113.  Id. at 155. 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss2/4
2019] GOING BEYOND SUFFRAGE 405 
realities”114), may have brought the change. One recent description of the 
film contends, “[W]hen an anti-prostitution law was passed in Japan a few 
months after its release, some said the film had been a catalyst.”115 
VI. CONSTITUTION
During the Occupation, a revised Constitution for Japan was drafted 
and adopted.116 As a result, Japan’s Constitution not only guarantees 
women’s suffrage (“Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to 
the election of public officials”—Article 15 of the Constitution of Japan), 
but, unlike the U.S., Japan’s Constitution provides women’s rights beyond 
suffrage. Going beyond the Nineteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, the Japanese constitutional reform resulted in articles of 
equal rights: 
• Article 14 of the Constitution of Japan states: “All of the
people are equal under the law and there shall be no
discrimination in political, economic or social relations
because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.”117
• Article 24 of the Constitution of Japan states: “With regard
to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of
domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage
and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of
individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.” 118
In addition, the Constitution of Japan provides: 
• “All of the people shall be respected as individuals.” (Article
13)
• “Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both
sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation
 114.  National Museum of Asian Art, Street of Shame, SMITHSONIAN, https://asia.si.edu/events-
overview/films/?trumbaEmbed=view%3Devent%26eventid%3D131675307 [https://perma.cc/LS8J-
XS7D]. 
115.  Id.  
 116.  For a human rights historical perspective, see Sylvia Brown Hamano, Incomplete 
Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese Constitution and Human Rights, 1 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 415 (1999). 
117.  CONST. OF JAPAN, art. 14, 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html 
[https://perma.cc/DTB2-X4W7 ]..  
118.  Id. art. 24.  
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with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.” (Article 
24) 
• “All people shall have the right to receive an equal education
correspondent to their ability, as provided by law. All people
shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their
protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law.
Such compulsory education shall be free.” (Article 26)
On October 4, 1945, General MacArthur ordered Prince Knoye to: 
• liberalize [the] Constitution;
• extend suffrage to women;
• have an election; and
• clear militarists out of control.119
When the prince protested that he did not have authority to do enact the 
changes ordered by General MacArthur, General MacArthur replied: 
“The entire government lives by my sufferance. I shall authorize all these 
changes—get busy.”120 
To reinforce his demand for a liberalized constitution for Japan, on 
October 11, 1945, General MacArthur, in his meeting with Prime Minister 
Shidehara, “pointedly advised that the reforms which Japan must take 
‘will unquestionably involve a liberalization of the Constitution.’”121 
General MacArthur also “pointedly advised” the Japanese Minister that 
“[t]hese reforms are so fundamental in character that they cannot be 
effected by statutory legislation alone but necessitate inclusion in the 
Constitution in order to ensure their permanency.”122 
When the Japanese government in January 1946, in response to 
General MacArthur’s demand for a liberalized constitution, produced a 
“rewording of the old Meiji constitution,”123 the press ridiculed it.124 One 
of the female Occupationaires maintained that “ordinary, everyday people 
– even as they were struggling for survival – were more willing than
political and academic elites to discard the Meiji constitution and start 
 119.  Bonner Fellers, Notebook of General Bonner Fellers, Oct. 4, 1945, MacArthur Memorial 
Archives. 
120.  Id. 
121.  SUMMATION SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1945, supra note 26, at 8. 
122.  Id. 
123.  MACARTHUR, supra note 1, at 300. 
124.  NASSRINE AZIMI & MICHEL WASSERMAN, LAST BOAT TO YOKOHAMA: THE LIFE AND 
LEGACY OF BEATE SIROTA GORDON 59 (2015). 
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afresh.”125 As a result of the inability of the Japanese government to draft 
a constitution that met General MacArthur’s expectations, MacArthur 
decided to have the Government Section of SCAP draft a constitution.126 
On February 3, 1946, General MacArthur ordered General Whitney, the 
head of the Government Section, to have the Government Section draft a 
model constitution.127 The deadline: February 12, 1946.128 General 
MacArthur’s need for speed may be explained by the desire to have a 
constitution drafted before the Far East Commission had its meeting the 
end of February,129 to protect the emperor from being declared a war 
criminal.130 The content of the notes that MacArthur provided for 
guidance included: 
1) safeguard of a dynastic but symbolic emperor representative of
the people;
2) renunciation of war; and
3) dismantling of the feudal system.131
On February 4, 1946, General Whitney sat down with his team to begin 
the process of drafting a new constitution.132 The team had nine days.133 
The writing of the Constitution was in secret. 
The sole woman on the Government Section charged with writing 
the Constitution was Beate Sirota. A 22-year-old graduate of Mills 
College, Sirota had grown up in Japan and did not become a U.S. citizen 
until 1945.134 Sirota, to aid her in drafting her sections, raced around a 
decimated Tokyo to find and examine constitutions from around the 
world.135 
One of Sirota’s constitutional drafting responsibilities was drafting a 
section on women’s rights. Sirota sought to draft the “changes that would 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. at 60. 
127.  RAY A. MOORE, SOLDIER OF GOD: MACARTHUR’S ATTEMPT TO CHRISTIANIZE JAPAN 75 
(2011). 
128.  AZIMI & WASSERMAN, supra note 124, at 60. 
129.  Id. at 101. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. at 61. 
132.  Id. at 101. 
133.  Id. at 60. 
134.  DALE M. HELLEGERS, WE, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE: WORLD WAR II AND THE ORIGINS OF 
THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 581 (2002). 
135.  AZIMI & WASSERMAN, supra note 124, at 60, 102. 
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most benefit Japanese women.”136 She drafted provisions that included 
“equality in regard to property rights, inheritance, education, and 
employment; suffrage; public assistance for expectant and nursing 
mothers as needed (whether married or not); free hospital care; and 
marriage with a man of her choice.”137 Sirota’s draft provisions included 
the “rights of expecting and nursing mothers and full medical, dental, and 
optical treatment for school-age children.”138 For example, a first draft 
stated: “Expectant and nursing mothers shall have the protection of the 
State, and such public assistance as they may need, whether married or 
not.”139 A first draft also stated: “Women shall have the right of access to 
all professions and occupations, including the right to hold office, and 
shall receive the same compensation as men for equal work.”140 
Sirota’s draft women’s rights provisions engendered fierce 
exchanges regarding the goals of the Constitution. Sirota’s two immediate 
[male] co-workers, Lieutenant Colonel Roest and Dr. Wildes, fiercely 
defended her provisions. Lieutenant Colonel Roest claimed: “[It is] 
peculiarly necessary to include them [women’s rights social guarantees] 
here that since state responsibility for the welfare of its people is a new 
concept for Japan and demands constitutional approval to encourage its 
widespread acceptance, at present women are chattel here . . . and any 
peasant can sell his daughter if the rice crop is bad.”141 Dr. Wildes went 
even further arguing: “We have the responsibility to effect a social 
revolution in Japan, and the most expedient way of doing that is to force 
through a reversal of social patterns by means of the constitution.”142 
Yet, in overriding these concerns and in justifying excluding 
women’s social guarantees, other males pushed back. Lieutenant Colonel 
Rowell maintained: “It isn’t the Government Section’s job to establish a 
perfect system of guarantees. If we push hard for things like this, we could 
well encounter strong opposition. In fact, I think there is a danger the 
Japanese government might well reject our draft entirely.”143 
 136.  BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM: A MEMOIR OF JAPAN, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE ARTS 108 (2014). 
137.  Id. 
138.  AZIMI & WASSERMAN, supra note 124, at 62 n.5. 
139.  HELLEGERS, supra note 134, at 590 (art. 19 of the first draft). 
140.  Id. at 591 (art. 26 of the first draft). 
141.  Id. at 603–04 n.64 (citing Ellerman Notebook D in HUSSEY PAPERS). Colonel Roest’s 
spouse, Jean-Marie Roest, was a Stanford graduate who was in Japan as a WAC working for Radio 
Tokyo on getting out the women’s vote, HELLEGERS, supra note 134, at 580. 
142.  SIROTA GORDON, supra note 136, at 116. 
143.  Id. 
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While individuals with more power in the drafting of the Constitution 
feared pushing for women’s rights, they had no hesitancy to use their 
power to force the Japanese government to accept the Constitution written 
by the Occupationaires. General Whitney, when he ordered the drafting 
of the Constitution by the Government Section on February 4, 1946, told 
the drafters that if the Japanese government “hope to protect the Emperor 
and to maintain political power, they have no choice but to accept a 
constitution with a progressive approach, namely the fruits of our current 
efforts.”144 He continued: “I expect we’ll manage to persuade them. But 
if it looks as though it might prove impossible, General MacArthur has 
already authorized both the threat of force and the actual use of force.”145 
Sirota’s male bosses, before submitting the draft constitution to the 
Japanese government on February 13, 1946,146 stripped the draft 
Constitution of many of the rights for women that Sirota had written into 
the draft Constitution. In her testimony to the U.S. Congress decades later, 
she testified: “Col[onel] Kades (head of the Steering Committee) said: 
‘Beate, you have given women more rights than there are in the U.S. 
Constitution!’”147 Her response? “I said: ‘That’s not difficult, since the 
U.S. Constitution does not even mention the word woman.’”148 
Some of the U.S. males involved in the drafting of the Constitution 
believed that women’s rights social guarantees “were not appropriate for 
a constitution, but belonged in the Civil Code which the Japanese would 
write later.”149 Such beliefs ignored the reality that “social guarantees 
[were] common in the constitutions of many European countries.”150 The 
holders of these beliefs further ignored and failed to pay heed to Sirota’s 
insight and forecast that “the bureaucrats who would be assigned to write 
those statutes for the Civil Code would . . . be so conservative that they 
could not be relied upon to extend adequate rights to women” and that the 
“only safeguard was to specify these rights in the Constitution.”151 
The Occupation then forwarded its draft Constitution to the Japanese 
government. On March 4–5, 1946, the MacArthur and the Japanese teams 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. at 105. 
146.  RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE 
NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR 104 (2002). 
 147.  Winning the Peace: Coalition Efforts to Restore Iraq: Hearing Before the H. Committe on 
Government Reform, 108th Congr. 162 (2003) (Testimony of Beate Sirota Gordon, Drafter of the 
Article on Women’s Rights in the New Japanese Constitution). 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. 
150.  SIROTA GORDON, supra note 136, at 115. 
151.  Id. 
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engaged in a marathon negotiating session.152 The negotiations started at 
10 a.m. on March 4, 1946.153 During the negotiations, Sirota appeared in 
the role of interpreter as the negotiators went “over the draft word by 
word.”154 
Sirota recounts, after 16 hours, it was “2 a.m. the next morning [and] 
everybody was hungry and tired.”155 She further recounts that “Col[onel] 
Kades . . . noticed that the Japanese officials were very kindly inclined 
toward me . . . because I was a very fast interpreter.”156 At 2 a.m. on 
March 5, 1946, the negotiations on women’s rights began. The negotiators 
were all men, not women. Sirota states: “What I remember about the 
discussion on women’s rights is that the Japanese didn’t want any of 
them.”157 Sirota recalls that “it became an unbelievable fight about 
women’s rights—they felt that none of it should be in the Constitution; 
that it was against Japanese culture, against Japanese history, against 
Japanese customs.”158 Sirota further recalls that “when they said all this, 
Col[onel] Kades said: ‘Gentlemen, Miss Sirota has been in Japan a long 
time, she knows the Japanese women very well, and she has her heart set 
on the women’s rights. Why don’t we pass them?’ And they did.”159 What 
Colonel Kades did not disclose to the Japanese negotiators was that Beate 
Sirota was the author of the women’s rights provisions. Thus, to the 
Japanese it appeared Sirota was “merely an interpreter, since her U.S. 
counterpart had kept secret [her] involvement in the writing of the 
draft.”160 
The draft Constitution, after the negotiations, then went to the 
Japanese Diet for debate. When the Japanese government’s draft, based 
on MacArthur’s draft (the draft finalized by the Government Section on 
February 13, 1946), was presented to the National Diet, Japanese female 
legislators of the lower house offered an amendment that was almost the 
same as the original draft written by Sirota.161 Koseki Shōichi writes that 
just like “on the American side, their amendment was ignored by their 
152.  HELLEGERS, supra note 134, at 673.  
 153.  Kyoko Sato, A Half-Century Secret: U.S. had woman help draft Constitution, JAPAN 
TIMES, July 4, 1995, at 3. 
154.  Id. 
155.  Hugh Levinson, The Unsung Heroine of Women’s Rights, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at 
10. 
156.  Id. 
157.  Sato, supra note 153, at 3. 
158.  Levinson, supra note 155, at 10. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Sato, supra note 153, at 3. 
161.  KOSEKI SHŌICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 3 (Ray Moore ed. & 
trans., 1997).  
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male colleagues in the Diet.”162 However, Koseki Shōichi maintains that 
free elementary education (Article 26) was made stronger through the Diet 
debates than it had been in either the U.S. or the Japanese government 
drafts.163 
One example to examine is the draft section on the family. Dale 
Hellegers contends that the MacArthur Draft states, with regard to the 
family: 
The family is the basis of human society and its traditions for good or 
evil permeate the nation. Marriage shall rest upon the indisputable legal 
and social equality of both sexes, founded upon mutual consent instead 
of parental coercion, and maintained through cooperation instead of 
male domination. Laws contrary to these principles shall be abolished 
and replaced by others viewing choice of spouse, property rights, 
inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce, and other matters pertaining to 
marriage and the family from the standpoint of individual dignity and 
the essential equality of the sexes.164 
The Japanese draft countered with a section on the family system 
worded as: “Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both 
sexes. Moreover, it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation, with 
the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.”165 Today’s Article 24 of 
the Constitution of Japan states: “Marriage shall be based only on the 
mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual 
cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.” And 
today’s Article 24 states: “With regard to choice of spouse, property 
rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters 
pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the 
standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.” 
Once written, the Constitution came into effect in less than two years 
after the beginning of the Occupation. The sequence for the Constitution 
to come into existence was: 
• August 24, 1946; House of Representatives adopts
Constitution by a vote of 422:8.166
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. at 183. 
164.  HELLEGERS, supra note 134, at 673 (Article 23 of the draft, as finalized by the Government 
Section on February 13, 1946 (“MacArthur Draft”)). 
165.  Id. (Article 37 of the Japanese draft of March, 2 1946).  
 166.  HARRY EMERSON WILDES, TYPHOON IN TOKYO; THE OCCUPATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
46 (1954). 
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• September 6, 1946; House of Peers adopts Constitution with
“minor amendments” by a vote of 298:2.167
• October 7, 1946; House of Representatives approves
amended version of the Constitution.168
• October 29, 1946; Privy Council approves Constitution.169
• November 3, 1946 (Emperor Meiji’s Birthday); Constitution
is promulgated.170
• May 3, 1947; Constitution comes into effect.171
The question remains what role a constitution performs in the 
structuring of national identity, beliefs, and actions. General MacArthur 
acknowledged that “the drafting of an acceptable constitution does not of 
itself establish democracy, which is a thing largely of the spirit,” but 
maintained that “it does provide the design for both structural and spiritual 
changes in the national life, without which so fundamental a reform would 
be utterly impossible.”172 Not all of General MacArthur’s subordinates 
understood what General MacArthur was trying to accomplish with an 
“acceptable constitution.” Lieutenant Colonel Rowell is quoted as stating: 
“You cannot impose a new mode of social thought on a country by 
law.”173 
VII.ELECTIONS
While the Japanese government, during the Occupation, ended a 
political system that prohibited women the rights to vote and to be elected, 
the political system sought to maintain power. The 1946 and 1947 
elections provided for different balloting systems. These different systems 
provided different outcomes. Electing women is a potentially 
economically smarter vote. In the U.S., evidence suggests that electing 
women to office is more financially rewarding for the voter than electing 
men to office. A 2015 CRS report finds, “while controlling for numerous 
other factors including district-level characteristics, an empirical model 
167.  Id. 
168.  KURT STEINER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN 86 (1965). 
169.  Id. 
170.  CONST. OF JAPAN, supra note 117. 
171.  Id. 
172.  LA CERDA, supra note 86, at 220. 
173.  SIROTA GORDON, supra note 136, at 116. 
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demonstrates that women deliver approximately 9% more federal 
spending to their districts than men.”174 
A. 7.1 Balloting System of 1946 
The 1946 balloting system allowed the voter to vote for at least two 
individuals.175 As explained by a Japanese newspaper, the 1946 system 
“aims at . . . (1) prevention of a local man of influence from being elected, 
and election of a nationally known man by enlarging spheres of choice of 
electors” and “(2) prevention of monopolization of seats by the majority, 
and the opportunity for minority representation.”176 Or as another 
newspaper explained: “As the result of the adoption of a major electorate 
system, traditional constituencies have been broken up, increasing the 
possibilities of new men’s success.”177 A SCAP election analysis opined 
that the 1946 voting system “contributed largely to the success of 
independents and small party candidates,” preventing the larger parties 
from “captur[ing] more than their fair share of seats,” with at least one 
independent candidate elected in 43 of the 46 prefectures, “a phenomenon 
that has never before appeared in Japan’s political history.”178 
The 1946 balloting system was positive for women. On April 10, 
1946 (the first election with women’s suffrage), voters elected 38 women 
to the House of Representatives, a body of 466 members.179 At this time, 
the U.S. had 11 women in the House of Representatives, out of a body of 
435.180 
General Whitney reported that “nearly 50% of all women candidates 
were elected” as opposed to “only 15% of all men candidates.”181 A SCAP 
 174.  Jennifer E. Manning, Ida A. Brudnick & Colleen J. Shogan, Women in Congress: 
Historical Overview, Tables, and Discussion, CONG. RES. SERV. 13 (April 29, 2015), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43244.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MV9-XQ78]. 
175.  HUSSEY PAPERS, supra note 13, at 17-A-1-1. 
 176.  Gen. Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translation, No. 82, Political Series: 19, ITEM 3, Various Aspects of the 
Election System - Tokyo Shimbun - 14 Nov 45. Translator: T. Kitayama, at 2–4, DARTMOUTH C. 
LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/political-
0082-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/A2HP-2G2X]. 
177.  Gen. Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Sec. Press Translations, Press Translations No. 446, Political Series: 102, Item 2, Viewing 
the Election - Asahi Shimbun - 19 Dec 45. Translator: T. Kitayama, DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., 
https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/Press_Translations_Japanese/diplomatic/political-0446-
diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/TD3U-64PK]. 
 178.  22 April 1946, Memo for the Supreme Commander, Election Report, HUSSEY PAPERS, 
supra note 13, at 17-A-3-22. 
179.  HUSSEY PAPERS, supra note 13, at 17-A-3-19. 
180.  Manning, supra note 174. 
181.  WHITNEY, supra note 73, at 290. 
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analysis found “striking testimony of the independence with which the 
women went to the polls.”182 Of the women elected, six were 
Progressives, five were Liberals, eight were Socialists, one was 
Communist, eight were from small parties, and ten were independents.183 
Over 13 million Japanese women voted.184 On April 25, 1946, 
General MacArthur stated: “The uncertainty as to the trend of attitude of 
women to their new found freedom which characterized the Japanese 
press prior to election was dissipated when 66 percent of the eligible 
women cast their ballot.”185 In contrast, in the U.S., women made up 35–
40 percent of the U.S. electorate on November 2, 1920.186 
Beate Sirota, when questioned whether she remembered the first 
general election in April 1946, replied: “I had never seen so many women 
in one place. I saw old women in their 80s, carrying their grandchildren 
on their backs, come in. I saw women very well-dressed, who were 
younger, who were coming to this with sort of awe.”187 U.S. journalist 
John La Cerda reported: “They carried their babies with them to the polls. 
In one Tokyo ward, five aged women were carried to the ballot stalls in 
stretchers.”188 
Japan adopted the balloting system for the 1946 elections at the 
urging of SCAP’s POLAD (political advisor), George Atcheson.189 Then, 
on March 27, 1947, Japan’s Election Law Committee, in a 16-14 decision 
after a brawl between members, eliminated the 1946 system.190 
182.  HUSSEY PAPERS, supra note 13, at 17-A-3-22.  
 183.  Id. at 17-A-4-1 (The independent women who won were Wazaki Haru, Sakakibara Chiyo, 
Yamashita Harue, Nomura Misu, Oishie Yoshie, Kimura Chiyo, Nakayama Tama, Tanaka Tatsu, 
Kondo Tsuruyo, and Yamashita Tsune, List of Successful Candidates). 
184.  WHITNEY, supra note 73, at 290. 
185.  POLICY AND PROGRESS, supra note 12, at App. 30, 140, 141 (April 25, 1945, statement by 
General MacArthur). 
 186.  REBECCA BOGGS ROBERTS, SUFFRAGIST IN WASHINGTON DC: THE 1913 PARADE AND THE 
FIGHT FOR THE VOTE 135 (2017). 
187.  Levinson, supra note 155, at 10. 
188.  LA CERDA, supra note 86, at 89. 
189.  WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 176. More research is required to ascertain Atcheson’s 
subsequent influence, he was killed on August 17, 1947 in an aircraft accident off Hawaii. RICHARD 
B. FINN, WINNERS IN PEACE: MACARTHUR, YOSHIDA, AND POSTWAR JAPAN 147 (1992). 
 190.  WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 177 (addressing May 2, 1947 “Diet report—”Filibuster on the 
Election Law Amendment.). 
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B. 7.2 Balloting System of 1947 
The 1947 balloting system reduced the voter to being allowed to vote 
for only one candidate,191 even though the number of candidates to be 
elected in each electoral district varied from three to five,192 “making it 
impossible for voters to choose both a man and a woman.”193 The 1947 
balloting system, in contrast to the 1946 balloting system, aimed to 
“attract to the House of Councillors men, prominent in various 
professions, who can contribute their technical experience to the 
legislative process and would be essentially non-partisan in outlook.”194 
It also appeared to eliminate those without financial means. The 1947 
House of Councillors Election Law required a deposit of 5,000 yen, to be 
forfeited to the Japanese government, should the candidate not have 
received at least one-tenth of total votes.195 The stated purpose: “[T]o 
eliminate candidates who have no hope of being elected, in this way the 
voters should be less confused by a great number of candidates and the 
government’s expenses for the campaign will be smaller.”196 Instead of 
reducing confusion, the ensuing confusion by the changes resulted in 
10.37% of the ballots rejected in the 1947 House of Councillors 
election.197 
In 1947, under the new balloting system, the result was a more than 
50% drop in women elected to the House of Representatives (from over 
30 in 1946 to 15 in 1947).198 Further, under the new balloting system—in 
the first elections for women for the House of Councillors; prefectural 
assemblies; city assemblies; and town and village assemblies—women 
won only 10; 22; 94 (including 16 in Tokyo); and 677 seats, 
respectively.199 Women comprised 818 of the 232,864 officials elected to 
 191.  HUSSEY PAPERS, supra note 13, at 17-B-2-8, 17-B-2-45 (Article 19 of Law for Election of 
Members of House of Representatives (for 1947 elections)). 
192.  Id. at 17-B-2-8. 
 193.  Sally Ann Hastings, Women Legislators in the Postwar Diet, in RE-IMAGING JAPANESE 
WOMEN 275 (Anne E. Imamura ed., 1996). 
194.  U.S. DEPT. OF ST., DIVISION OF RESEARCH FOR FAR EAST, 1947 JAPANESE HOUSE OF 
COUNCILLORS ELECTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONDUCT AND RESULTS OF THE HOUSE OF 
COUNCILLORS ELECTION, INCLUDING A DISCUSSION OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
OPERATION OF THE UPPER HOUSE IN THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD vi (1948) [hereinafter 
COUNCILLORS ELECTION]. 
195.  HUSSEY PAPERS, supra note 13, at 17-B-2-23, Article 55. 
196.  Id. at 17-B-2-24, “NOTE.” 
197.  COUNCILLORS ELECTION, supra note 194, at 12 n.1.  
198.  JACOB VAN STAAVEREN, AN AMERICAN IN JAPAN, 1945-1948: A CIVILIAN VIEW OF THE 
OCCUPATION 151 (1994).  
199.  Id. 
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public office in April 1947;200 that is, 0.35% of all seats went to women 
while men garnered 99.65% of elected seats. 
In addition to an altered balloting system, the 1947 elections also 
introduced another burden for potential voters—four elections within the 
space of one month: 
• April 5 (elections for the local executives, mayors, and
governors);
• April 20 (the first House of Councillors election);
• April 25 (elections for the House of Representatives); and
• April 30 (elections for members of prefectural and municipal
assemblies).201
The stated rationale for not holding the elections for the House of 
Representatives and the House of Councillors on the same day: the “heavy 
work involved in screening the purge questionnaire of the two Houses.”202 
Given that the House of Councillors election was not postponed for a mere 
five days (which would have resulted in the elections for the House of 
Councillors and the elections for the House of Representatives being held 
on the same day), the question arises whether the election machinery was 
interested in facilitating voting. The U.S. State Department opined that the 
lower turn-out of voters was due to: (1) calling voters to the polls four 
times in April 1947; (2) “lack of understanding of balloting system”; and 
(3) “belief that the upper house was not as important as the lower 
house.”203 
The U.S. State Department failed to address whether the “handicaps 
of the transportation difficulties”204 still existed. The U.S. State 
Department, in evaluating the 1947 elections, failed to conduct any 
analysis of whether the changed election law and multiple elections had a 
disparate effect on women. The lack of analysis by the U.S. State 
Department included failing to identify the number of women voting and 
the number of women elected.205 
200.  Id. 
201.  COUNCILLORS ELECTION, supra note 194, at vi, 18. 
202.  HUSSEY PAPERS, supra note 13, at 17-B-2-8. 
203.  COUNCILLORS ELECTION, supra note 194, at 47. 
204.  HUSSEY PAPERS, supra note 13, at 17-A-3-25. 
205.  COUNCILLORS ELECTION, supra note 194, App. B.  
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C. 7.3 Anti-Women Politician Smear Campaigns 
The evaluation by the U.S. State Department of the elections in Japan 
also failed to address the use of political psychological violence against 
female politicians through smear campaigns. Campaigns to smear female 
politicians extended to at least one in-person campaign to General 
MacArthur. General MacArthur recounts a call from “an extremely 
dignified . . . Japanese legislative leader”; a male graduate of Harvard 
Law School206: 
• Male Legislative Leader: “I regret to say that something
terrible has happened. A prostitute, Your Excellency, has
been elected to the House of Representatives.”
• General MacArthur: “How many votes did she receive?”
• Male Legislative Leader: “256,000.”
• General MacArthur: “Then I should say there must have
been more than her dubious occupation involved.”207
The April 1946 election resulted in “hundreds of unknowns . . . 
elected to replace the old order of the Diet, 80% of which had been 
handpicked by Tojo during World War II.”208 Whether the Harvard Law 
School graduate male legislative leader making the personal appeal to 
General MacArthur was among those handpicked is unknown. 
The campaigns to smear female politicians were not limited to 
personal appeals to General MacArthur. The media also conducted public 
smear campaigns against female politicians. La Cerda noted: “Shortly 
after the election of April 10, 1946 . . . a Tokyo suburban newspaper 
proclaimed to its readers that 30 of those women [elected] were former 
prostitutes and mistresses.”209 The response from the Occupation: “The 
WAC [Women’s Army Corps] censorship officer who saw the startling 
announcement after publication called in the editor and made him publish 
an apology and print extensive biographies of the women to prove he had 
lied!”210 
206.  MACARTHUR, supra note 1, at 305.  
 207.  Id. The SCAP election analysis indicates that the woman receiving the highest number of 
votes was Michiko Yamazaki, a Social Democrat, with an aggregate of 191,293 votes. The male 
receiving the highest number of votes received 211,146 votes. HUSSEY PAPERS, supra note 13, at 17-
A-3-23, Election Report, “The Women’s Vote.” 
208.  Id. at 17-A-2-1, 22 April 1946, Memo for the Supreme Commander, “Election Report”; 
WHITNEY, supra note 73, at 263. 
209.  LA CERDA, supra note 86, at 142. 
210.  Id. 
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VIII. CIVIL CODE
The drafter of the women’s rights provisions of the Constitution, 
Beate Sirota, in arguing that the “only safeguard” for women’s rights “was 
to specify these rights in the constitution,” believed that “the bureaucrats 
who would be assigned to write those statutes for the Civil Code 
would . . . be so conservative that they could not be relied upon to extend 
adequate rights to women.”211 
The bureaucrats who could not be relied upon included the U.S. 
Occupation lawyer who oversaw the revision of the Civil Code, Alfred 
Oppler. Despite recognizing that the “new constitutional principles” 
regarding equal rights necessitated implementing legislation and that “[i]t 
was clear that the authoritative feature of the ‘house’ system were doomed 
to disappear,” Oppler determined that “the Occupation was extremely 
reluctant to take initiative with regard to this legislation (the Civil 
Code).”212 His reasoning: “[H]ow far the system as such could be 
continued in a modified form was a subtle and controversial question, the 
decision which appeared wise to leave to the Japanese themselves.”213 
Oppler opined: “This was one of the most important instances where the 
Occupation exercised self-restraint.”214 
With an influential Occupation male “restraining” himself (arguably 
fulfilling Sirota’s fear that those drafting women’s rights legislation 
“could not be relied upon to extend adequate rights to women”), Japanese 
women exercised their power. After discussions “among the Japanese in 
planning committees, in the press, and in public hearings of the Diet,”215 
“the final decision reached was a complete abolition of the house 
system.”216 Oppler conceded: “This outcome was considerably influenced 
by the vigorous arguments of leading women.”217 He then explained, “It 
should be understood that the women are the largest group to benefit from 
such a radical change in the sphere of domestic life”218; an explanation 
that highlights the consequences of having the ability to exercise power, 
or not. This included Representative Mrs. Sakakibara, who won while 
running as an independent.219 According to historian Mary Beard, “so 
211.  SIROTA GORDON, supra note 136, at 115. 
212.  Oppler, supra note 39, at 318.  
213.  Id. 
214.  Id. 
215.  Id. 
216.  Id. 
217.  Id. 
218.  Id. 
219.  The independent women who won were Wazaki Haru, Sakakibara Chiyo, Yamashita 
Harue, Nomura Misu, Oishie Yoshie, Kimura Chiyo, Nakayama Tama, Tanaka Tatsu, Kondo 
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persuasive” were the speeches of female politicians, “relative to the 
sufferings of women and children under the inherited aggregation of 
families with its headship by men,” that not only was the system 
“abolished,” but that “[i]t was not to be retained even as a symbol of 
tradition.”220 The Joint Press Conference of Civil Information and 
Education Section and Government Section, of August 1, 1947, 
proclaimed: 
Certainly of all the legislation which has been prepared to implement 
the guarantees of the New Constitution, this revision of the Civil Code 
has had the most penetrating and far reaching results. It has uprooted the 
legal “house” system under which for centuries junior members of 
families had been subjected to grave limitations of fundamental personal 
rights, and it has also recognized, as never before had been the case in 
Japanese law, the equality of husband and wife in all family matters, 
including inheritance.221 
The road to the Civil Code involved two codes. One was the “Bill 
for the Temporary Adjustments of the Civil Code Pursuant to the 
Enforcement of the Constitution of Japan” and the second was the “Civil 
Code.” The “temporary measures” were to “come into force as from the 
day of the enforcement of the Constitution of Japan.”222 The Constitution 
of Japan was not promulgated until November 3, 1946, and did not come 
into effect until May 3, 1947. The “temporary measures” were so 
temporary that the Bill stated: “This statute shall lose its effect on and 
after the 1st day of January 1948.”223 According to a Joint Press 
Conference on August 1, 1947, “In terms of the direct effect worked upon 
the lives and everyday activities of the people of Japan, the enforcement 
on May 3d, 1947, of the brief ten-article Law for the Temporary 
Adjustments of the Civil Code pursuant to the enforcement of the 
Constitution of Japan, was an event comparable to the promulgation of 
Tsuruyo, and Yamashita Tsune, List of Successful Candidates, HUSSEY PAPERS, supra note 13, at 17-
A-4-1.  
220.  MARY RITTER BEARD, THE FORCE OF WOMEN IN JAPANESE HISTORY 181 (1953). 
 221.  SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, PREPARATORY MATERIAL FOR THE 
REVISION OF THE JAPANESE CIVIL LAW: PREPARED IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE AMERICAN 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR JAPAN, Law for the Temporary Adjustments of the Civil Code—Joint 
Press Conference of Civil Information and Education Section and Government Section (Aug. 1, 1947) 
[hereinafter Joint Press Conference of Aug. 1, 1947]. 
222.  SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, PREPARATORY MATERIAL FOR THE 
REVISION OF THE JAPANESE CIVIL LAW: PREPARED IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE AMERICAN 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR JAPAN, Bill for the Temporary Adjustments of the Civil Code Pursuant 
to the Enforcement of the Constitution of Japan, Supplementary Provisions (1947) [hereinafter 
Temporary Adjustments Bill]. 
223.  Id.  
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the Constitution itself.”224 On the first Anniversary of the Constitution, 
General MacArthur issued a message providing a summary of 
achievements of the first year under the Constitution. On the list of 
achievements, he listed as number nine “important revisions of the Civil 
Code,” which he proclaimed “emphasized individual dignity and the 
essential equality of the sexes.”225 
The Bill for the Temporary Adjustments of the Civil Code Pursuant 
to the Enforcement of the Constitution of Japan was a two-page document 
with ten articles.226 Its stated purpose: “[T]o provide temporary measures 
with regard to the Civil Code which are founded upon individual dignity 
and the essential equality of the sexes, pursuant to the enforcement of the 
Constitution of Japan.”227 
Article 3 explicitly eliminated the “house” system stating: 
“Provisions relating to the head of the house and members of a house and 
all other regulations of houses shall not apply.” 
The dismantling of the house included eliminating the applicability 
of “provisions which, on the ground of the individual being a wife or 
mother, restrict legal capacity, etc” (Article 2); that “[p]rovisions relating 
to the succession to the Headship of a house shall not be applied” (Article 
7); and that “provisions of other statutes which are contrary to the 
provisions of this statute shall not apply” (Article 10). 
The dismantling of the house further included: 
• An adult shall not be required to obtain parental consent for
his or her marriage, divorce, adoption, or dissolution of
adoption. (Article 4)
• A husband and a wife shall live together at a place
determined by their mutual agreement. The application of
provisions concerning the regulation of the property of the
husband and the wife which are contrary to the essential
equality of the sexes shall be excluded. In cases where there
are extremely unchaste acts on the part of either spouse, the
other may bring an action for divorce on that ground.
(Article 5)
• Parental power shall be exercised jointly by the father and
the mother. If a father and a mother are divorced or if a father
224.  Joint Press Conference of Aug. 1, 1947, supra note 221. 
 225.  SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 
SUMMATION OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN, MAY 1948, at 29 (Tokyo: SCAP 1945–1948).  
226.  Temporary Adjustments Bill, supra note 222. 
227.  Id. at Art. 1. 
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has acknowledged a child, the person who exercises parental 
power must be determined by the mutual agreement of the 
father and the mother. When mutual agreement is not 
reached or when it cannot be reached, the court shall make 
the determination. The court may change the person who 
exercises parental power in the interest of the child. (Article 
6) 
The Temporary Bill also addressed inheritance (Article 8 and 9). 
The Joint Press Conference raised issues needing to be addressed in 
the post-temporary Civil Code. Issues raised included, but were not 
limited to: 
• The existence and degree of obligations and duties to “render
mutual assistance and support” among relatives, to include
non-blood relatives such as a widowed wife.228
• The “Capacity of an Illegitimate Child to Inherit.”229
(Disputes raged as to whether “an illegitimate child is
entitled to one-half of the share in his [sic] father’s estate
which would go to a legitimate off-spring,” or “an
illegitimate child should have no rights of inheritance,” or
“he [sic] should be subject to no discrimination and should
inherit a full share in his ancestor’s estate.”230)
• The “Effects of Marriage on Property,” given that “the wife
who normally does not hold in her own name the property
acquired as a result of her participation in the family
business.”231
On January 1, 1948, the new Civil Code came into effect,232 replacing the 
interim temporary Code. Book I of Civil Code of Japan addresses 
“General Provisions.” Article 1-2 states: “This Code shall be construed 
from the standpoint of the dignity of individuals and the essential equality 
of the sexes.” Howard Meyers, the former SCAP Chief of the Criminal 
Affairs Branch, contended: “The Civil Code revision made such important 
changes in the ‘Family System’ as depriving the head of a house of his 
228.  Joint Press Conference of Aug. 1, 1947, supra note 221.  
229.  Id.  
230.  Id. 
231.  Id.  
232.  Kurt Steiner, Post War Changes in the Japanese Civil Code, 25 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B.J. 
286, 297 (1950).  
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power to prevent a marriage if the member of the family is of age; 
cancelling his right to determine where members of the house should 
reside, allowing his wife to hold property in her own name.”233 The Civil 
Code revision also failed to make important changes. Kurt Steiner, the 
Chief of the Civil Affairs and Civil Liberties Branch of the Legislative 
Justice Division of the SCAP Headquarters, in 1950, wrote about silences 
in the Civil Code. Examples of the silences surrounding unaddressed 
practices included “voluntary” forfeiture of inheritance, “adoption” child 
trafficking, and “marriages on probation.”234 
When preparing the post-interim Civil Code, one issue was whether 
there should exist a “Procedure for Obtaining a Consentual [sic] Divorce” 
to “ensure that a genuine desire for divorce is present in the minds of both 
parties, and that no undue or improper pressure has been applied.”235 
Consensual divorce (“most of the cases . . . the husband wanted a 
divorce”) were the result of “strong persuasion bordering on coercion.”236 
Oppler was “aware of the danger that [divorce by consent] would continue 
to work to the disadvantage of the wife due to her de facto subordinate 
position.”237 
Steiner explained that “divorce by agreement” was “frequently a 
disguise for an actual ‘expulsion of the wife’ who had, for instance, failed 
to win the good will of her parents-in-law.”238 La Cerda observed: 
“Divorce is easy for the man. He and his wife go to the local public 
registrar’s office and sign a statement of willingness to go their separate 
ways.”239 Mrs. Oku Muneo, a member of the House of Councillors, in 
arguing for an amendment requiring the attestation of the court of 
domestic relations that the divorce sought to be granted was not a result 
of coercion, maintained an attestation by the court that the divorce was 
not a result of coercion was necessary given the equality of the sexes had 
not yet been achieved.240 The House of Councillors passed the amendment 
by a vote of 102–75, then, under the argument that “freedom of divorce 
should be as complete as freedom of marriage,” the House of 
 233.  Howard Meyers, Revisions of the Criminal Code of Japan during the Occupation, 25 
WASH. L. REV. & ST. B. J. 104, 124 n.34 (1950) (Law for Partial Amendments to the Civil Code, No. 
222 of 1947). 
234.  Steiner, supra note 232, at 307, 309. 
235.  Joint Press Conference of Aug. 1, 1947, supra note 221.  
236.  Hideo Tanaka, Legal Equality among Family Members in Japan–The Impact of the 
Japanese Constitution of 1946 on the Traditional Family System, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 625 (1980). 
 237.  ALFRED OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK 118 
(1976). 
238.  Steiner, supra note 232, at 302. 
239.  LA CERDA, supra note 86, at 57. 
240.  Steiner, supra note 232, at 302. 
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Representatives defeated the amendment by more than a two-thirds 
majority.241 La Cerda opined: “In bringing democracy to Japan’s 
womanhood, consideration should be given to a change in their divorce 
customs.”242 Following his policy of “self-restraint,” Oppler refused to 
“object to the retention of the traditional system of divorce by consent” 
although he understood it harmed women.243 
A review of the 2016 CEDAW Committee’s Observations on Japan 
highlights the gaps that harm women. For example, the 2016 CEDAW 
Committee decried the issues resulting from the absence of legislation that 
govern the distribution of property upon dissolution of marriage in the 
State party. The CEDAW Committee found that, as a result of this absence 
of legislation: 
• Women are placed at a disadvantage because negotiations
and agreements on property distribution happen outside
legal regulation where power imbalances between women
and men exist.244
• Most divorcing women lack the necessary information and
means to demand disclosure of their husbands’ financial
situation, including business and career assets, as the law
does not provide any procedural tools and guidelines.245
• Cases where no agreement is reached for paying child
support, in which cases children are left destitute.246
If the gaps identified by CEDAW Committee are a result of Japanese 
and Occupation “bureaucrats . . . so conservative that they could not be 
relied upon to extend adequate rights to women,”247 the question for future 
research is how to recruit, employ, and retain bureaucrats who can be 
relied upon to extend adequate rights to women. The answer may be as 
easy as asking, during the hiring interview, the question: “How can you 
be relied upon to extend adequate rights for women?” 
241.  Id.  
242.  LA CERDA, supra note 86, at 57. 
243.  Hideo Tanaka, Alfred C. Oppler, Legal Reform in Occupied Japan: A Participant Looks 
Back, 9 L. JAPAN 144, 223 (1976). 
 244.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations 
on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of Japan, ¶ 48(a), CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/7-8 
(2016). 
245.  Id. at ¶ 48(b). 
246.  Id. at ¶ 48(c).  
247.  SIROTA GORDON, supra note 136, at 115. 
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IX. LABOR LAW
In late November 1945, the Occupation issued SCAPIN 360, 
“Employment Policies” of November 28, 1945. SCAPIN 360 “[d]irects 
Japanese Government to insure that no discrimination be exercised or 
permitted for or against any worker either in private or government work, 
in wages, hours, or working conditions by reasons of nationality, creed, 
or social status.”248 The November 1945 SCAPIN did not prohibit 
discrimination based on sex and gender. Instead, SCAPIN 360 ignored the 
reality of discrimination in the workplace against Japanese women. 
Sirota did not. Her draft of the Constitution stated: “Women shall 
have the right of access to all professions and occupations, including the 
right to hold office, and shall receive the same compensation as men for 
equal work.”249 Yet by June 25, 1946, when the Diet received the draft 
Constitution, provisions providing right of access to all professions and 
occupations, the right to hold office, and the right to equal pay were 
eliminated. The only vestiges of this language were, “Every person shall 
have the freedom to . . . choose his occupation to the extent that it does 
not interfere with the public welfare.”250 
In February 1946, a U.S. Advisory Committee on Labor, composed 
of U.S. government officials “who were labor experts in all phases of 
labor problems” and a representative of the AFL (the CIO representative 
“was unable to make the trip”) visited Japan.251 The Committee was 
composed of 12 individuals, who spent an average of three months each 
in Japan, each with different arrival and departure dates.252 The U.S. sent 
only one woman as an expert, Helen Mears. The report described Helen 
Mears as an expert in labor legislation and “women’s problems” as well 
as a lecturer on Japan at a Civil Affairs Training School.253 
The U.S. Advisory Committee on Labor found that “[t]raditionally 
Japanese women have taken part in the economic life of Japan in very 
great numbers.”254 The Committee stated: “It has been estimated that 
more than 80 percent of all Japanese women between the ages of 15 and 
248.  SCAP DIRECTIVES CATALOG, supra note 84, at 48. 
249.  HELLEGERS, supra note 134, at 591 (Art. 26 of the first draft). 
250.  SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SUMMARY 
OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN, JUNE 1946 at 34, Art. XX of Ch. 3 (Tokyo: SCAP 1945–
1948).  
251.  POLICY AND PROGRESS, supra note 12, at 44. 
 252.  SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON LABOR. FINAL REPORT. LABOR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS IN JAPAN ii (Tokyo: SCAP 
1946) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LABOR]. 
253.  Id. 
254.  Id. at 93. 
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59 work for wages or in family employment.”255 The Committee further 
found that women: 
• have taken their place beside men in the farms, having
dominated sericulture;
• have even worked at such heavy manual jobs as mining and
road building; and
• in the immediate pre-war period—they made up almost half
of the total industrial workers in factories employing ten or
more.256
The Committee determined that “[o]ne of the worst features of 
Japan’s traditional wage structure is the general practice of paying lower 
wages to women than to men, even when the duties of the job are 
identical.”257 (One U.S. journalist noted: “The disparity between female 
and male wages is astonishing. In most plants, men are paid 200% more 
than women.”258) The Committee found that the “custom” of unequal pay 
was “not only inconsistent with sound labor policy, but also contradicts a 
general objective of the Occupation—the removal of legal or institutional 
discrimination, which tends to the subordination of women.”259 The 
Committee opined: “Wage differences based solely on sex should be 
expressly forbidden by law.”260 The Committee, echoing the language of 
the U.S. National War Labor Board’s General Order No. 16 of November 
1943 requiring “equal pay for comparable quantity and quality of work on 
comparable operations,”261 recommended “that the principle of equal pay 
for male and female employees who perform work of same or comparable 
quality and quantity be established as a principle in wage and salary 
structures in Japan.”262 The resulting legislation mandated “Equal Wages 
for Both Sexes: The employer may not discriminate . . . in wages by 
reason of sex.”263 
255.  Id. 
256.  Id. 
257.  Id. at 12.  
258.  LA CERDA, supra note 86, at 131–32. 
259.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LABOR, supra note 252, at 12. 
260.  Id. 
261.  Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Harassment: Law for Women, By Women in Feminist Legal 
History: Essays on Women and Law 234 (Tracy A. Thomas and Tracey Jean Boisseau eds., 2011) 
(The U.S. Equal Pay Act did not become a reality until 1963) Pub. L. 88-39, 77 Stat. 56 (June 10, 
1963). 
262.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LABOR, supra note 252, at 60. 
 263.  JAPAN LAWS, STATUTES, ETC. RŌDO ̄ KIJUN HO ̄. LABOUR STANDARDS LAW, art. 4 (1969) 
[hereinafter LABOR STANDARDS LAW]. 
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Whether the equal pay legislation resulted in equal pay is debatable. 
For example, the May 1948 SCAP report acknowledged that, when 
teachers realized that the government was not going to honor its legal 
obligation to pay women and men equally, “[t]eachers of Hyogo and 
Kyoto Prefectures, including university and college professors, went on 
strikes when prefectural authorities rejected their demands for . . . 
elimination of pay differential by sex.”264 Yet, according to a July 1948 
SCAP report, inspections by 45 labor standards offices found only nine 
cases “dealing with equal wages to men and women for equal work.”265 
In contrast to Sirota, the Committee did not believe that “[w]omen 
shall have the right of access to all professions and occupations.”266 
Instead, the 1946 Committee recommended that “restrictions on the use 
of women in heavy work [should be] extended”;267 “the exceptions which 
permit women to work underground in certain mines should be 
eliminated”;268 “further restrictions should be placed on the use of women 
for heavy work during pregnancy”;269 and “an absolute limit of nine hours 
work per day, six days per week should be prescribed for women.”270 In 
the same report, the Committee acknowledged that “provisions proposed 
elsewhere would permit adult males to work longer hours . . . with 
premium pay.”271 A result of the Committee’s recommendations was the 
Labor Standards Law (Law No. 49 of April 7, 1947). The Labor Standards 
Law prohibited women (not men) from “dangerous” work,272 night 
work,273 overtime work,274 and working in underground coalmines.275 As 
a result, the Occupation eliminated the ability of unions to negotiate for 
overtime work and pay for female union members.276 The work of the 
Committee resulted not only in reducing the earnings of women, but also 
 264.  SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 
SUMMATION OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN, MAY 1948 at 278 (Tokyo: SCAP 1945–1948).  
 265.  SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 
SUMMATION OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN, JULY 1948 at 224 (Tokyo: SCAP 1945–1948) 
[hereinafter SUMMATION JULY 1948]. 
266.  HELLEGERS, supra note 134, at 591 (Article 26 of the first draft). 
267.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LABOR, supra note 252, at 17. 
268.  Id. at 94. 
269.  Id. 
270.  Id. at 95. 
271.  Id. 
272.  LABOR STANDARDS LAW, supra note 263, arts. 63, 49. 
273.  Id. at art. 62; see also Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1948 (No. 89), INT’L 
LAB. OFF., https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::
NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312234:NO [https://perma.cc/RJ2G-5T49]. 
274.  LABOR STANDARDS LAW, supra note 263, art. 32. 
275.  Id. art. 64. 
276.  Id. art. 61. 
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resulted in women losing their livelihoods; thereby endangering women 
and their families. 
The “protective legislation” harmed women who had worked as 
underground coal miners. As a result of the legislation, female coal miners 
lost jobs as underground coal miners. The government then froze women 
out of re-employment as surface coal miners. As SCAP reports, “Since 
April 1947 there has been a surplus of surface workers in the coal mines, 
necessitating a cabinet order freezing coal mine employment as of 30 
April 1948.”277 
Japanese women tried to fight back. In April 1948, SCAP 
Summation No. 31 of Non-Military Activities in Japan, reported on the 
“Niigata women stevedores, who must be released from their jobs 1 May 
as a result of the enforcement of the Labor Standards Law.”278 The female 
stevedores protested the loss of their jobs and sent delegates to the 
Minister of Labor and the Women’s and Minors’ Bureau to request 
“revision of the provisions on weight lifting.”279 Instead of protecting 
women by fighting for women to keep their jobs rather than losing them 
in the name of “protecting women,” the Bureau stated that “the law must 
be upheld and that adjustments had been made in other ports.”280 
The government then instituted circumventions and exceptions to the 
“protective” legislation. The circumventions and exemptions granted 
employers the legal ability to pay women even less. The June 1948 SCAP 
report revealed that the prohibition against women engaging in hazardous 
occupations and night work resulted in 15,000 vacancies.281 To 
circumvent the prohibition, by June 1948, the government amended the 
Labor Standards Law Apprenticeship Ordinance of October 1947 to 
permit employers to employ “women subject to provisions of certain 
hazardous occupation regulations” if employers hired women in the grade 
of “apprentices.”282 It is unknown how many women that employers 
rehired in the reduced grade of “apprentice.” Another exception created a 
loophole for employers to have the ability to engage women to work 
overtime in office work, when that office work involved the creation of 
 277.  SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 
SUMMATION OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN, APRIL 1948 at 328 (Tokyo: SCAP, 1945–
1948).  
278.  Id. at 218.  
279.  Id.  
280.  Id. 
281.  SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 
SUMMATION OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN JAPAN, JUNE 1948 at 223 (Tokyo, SCAP, 1945–1948).  
282.  SUMMATION JULY 1948, supra note 265, at 225.  
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“business documents.”283 (The extent to which office work did not involve 
the creation of “business documents” is unclear.) 
Women recognized that the exclusion of women from political 
power negatively influenced the laws addressing women. For example, 
when the minimum wage law was drafted to provide men triple the 
amount of minimum wage as women,284 women addressed the 
consequences of excluding women from decision-making: 
• “[W]omen’s committees must be recognized in all the labor
problems including the wage problem. . . I firmly oppose
men’s feudalistic way of handling matters which ignores
women’s opinions. Hitherto, women have been shut out
from expressing opinions, but hereafter rightful demands are
welcome.”285
• “The absence of women in the Wage Committee is the main
reason for a bill being written against women’s interests. The
proposal does not recognize any rights of working women.
It is nothing but a reactionary plan to confine women to the
family system as members to be supported, receiving
discriminatory treatment as before for the benefit of the
capitalists.”286
By 1951, even the Japanese Management Association recognized 
that “protective” measures served to harm women and to advantage men. 
The Japanese Management Association opined that “protective measures 
in the law are desirable and necessary”; however, the “current application 
of these provisions without due consideration of prevailing work 
conditions” as well as “the complicated procedures required by regulation 
in employing women have made it more advantageous to employ men in 
many cases even when the nature of the work is best suited for women.”287 
The Japanese Management Association found: “In countries with a large 
283.  LABOR STANDARDS LAW, supra note 263, art 61. 
 284.  Gen. Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Allied Translator and 
Interpreter Section, Press Translations, No. 1129, Economic Series: 259, Item 1, Women’s Voices 
Against Government Wage Draft - Yomiuri Hochi Shimbun - 3 Feb 46. Translator: R. Shibata, 2, 
DARTMOUTH C. LIBR., https://collections.dartmouth.edu/teitexts/Press_Translations_Japanese/
diplomatic/economic-1129-diplomatic.html [https://perma.cc/K7RQ-FFFK]. 
285.  Id. 
286.  Id. 
287.  KENZAI DOYU KAI (THE JAPAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION), POSTWAR ECONOMY OF 
JAPAN UNDER THE ANTI-MONOPLY LAW, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW, AND LABOR STANDARDS LAW 
18 (1951). 
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labor population, cumbersome though well-meant intentions of protecting 
the weaker sex are apt to result in increasing difficulty for women to find 
employment, as is now the tendency in Japan.”288 The Japan Management 
Association in 1951 found that “with the exception of a limited few cases, 
it is found generally impossible for Japanese industry to pay sufficiently 
high hourly wages enabling workers to earn a living within the restricted 
work day.”289 That is, given that the Labor Standards Law prohibited 
women from working “overtime,” the Labor Standards Law “protected” 
women from being able to earn a living. More research is required to 
identify the number of women who died or who were forced into male-
servicing occupations (such as prostitution) as a result of the inability 
imposed by law on women to earn a living. 
In addition to the “protective measures” harming women, the wage 
structure exacerbated the harm. The wage structure included “bonuses and 
payments for holiday work” as well as “allowances for dependents, 
seniority, and other factors not related to the job.”290 The government’s 
prohibitions against women resulted in women losing a bonus of 25% of 
base wages.291 Alice Shurcliff, in 1952, addressed how, given that 
“allowances can total more than the basic wage in the case of older male 
workers with many dependents,” the “wage structure results in far lower 
payments to women.”292 
Continued employment discrimination against women may be the 
reason that Japan is facing a brain drain today; that is, “a relatively high 
proportion of women researchers [are] leaving the country.”293 Japanese 
women are finding that they are “doing better outside of Japan than inside 
Japan in terms of the proportion of female specialist and managers” and 
the expectation is that more women will leave Japan as “the Japanese 
workplace is not as welcoming to women.”294 
288.  Id.  
289.  Id. at 15. 
290.  Alice W. Shurcliff, Wage Developments In Japan During The Occupation, 75 MONTHLY 
LAB. REV. 395, 397 (1952). 
291.  LABOR STANDARDS LAW, supra note 263, art. 37. 
292.  Shurcliff, supra note 290, at 397. 
293.  Gender in the Global Research Landscape: Analysis of Resarch Performance Through a 
Gender Lens Across 20 Years, 12 Geographies, and 27 Subject Areas, ELSEVIER 59 (2017), 
https://www.elsevier.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/265661/ElsevierGenderReport_final_for-
web.pdf. [https://perma.cc/5BXZ-VE2Q].  
 294.  Id. at 38, 40 (Interview of Miyoko O. Watanabe, Deputy Executive Director, Office for 
Diversity and Inclusion, Japan Science and Technology Office (JST)). 
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X. CONCLUSION 
In 1964, General MacArthur maintained: “Of all the reforms 
accomplished by the occupation in Japan, none was more heartwarming 
to me than this change in the status of women.”295 
As we look towards the 200th anniversary of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, the questions are many. 
• Will the history of the women’s emancipation policy remain
unknown?
• Will the contention of feminist international relations
scholar J. Ann Tickner, that “[g]overnments are generally
reluctant to make women’s human rights part of their foreign
policies . . . in supporting their empowerment,”296 remain
true?
• Will the U.S. Occupation experience of “female personnel,
to the extent that they became too closely associated with
their external constituency and with women’s rights issues,
ran the risk of criticism and censure from their SCAP
superiors and of psychological harassment, in the form of
malevolent joking behavior, from their male colleagues”297
remain the norm?
• Will opposition to women serving in the military continue to
blind and deafen the ability of academia and militaries to see
and hear and learn from military women?
• Will discrimination and violence against women continue to
be normalized or will all States (including the U.S.) have not
only ratified, but also implemented, the Convention on the
Elimination Against All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, as well as its Optional Protocol?
It is my hope that in 2119, at the 100th anniversary of the historic 
2019 Center for Constitutional Law at Akron School of Law conference 
on “The 19th Amendment at 100: From the Vote to Gender Equality,” that 
all discrimination against women will seem as shocking a concept as the 
preclusion of women as notaries was perceived at the 2019 conference. 
295.  MACARTHUR, supra note 1, at 305. 
 296.  J. ANN TICKNER, A FEMINIST VOYAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 145 
(Oxford University Press ed., 2014). 
297.  The Occupation of Japan: Education and Social Reform, the Proceedings of a Symposium 
sponsored by the MacArthur Memorial [and] Old Dominion University [and] the MacArthur 
Memorial Foundation held on October 16–18, 1980 at 418 (Thomas W. Burkman ed., 1980). 
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